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Luncheon Address 
Consequences of Federalizing Criminal Law 
The power of Congress to define federal crimes has been 
exercised more and more in recent years to criminalize conduct 
primarily and traditionally the concern of the several states. 
Although I refer to this development as the federalization of 
criminal law, a law school faculty colleague tells me that I 
should use the term "nationalization" rather than 
"federalization." Of course, he also thinks that the original 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists called themselves by the wrong 
names. With all due respect to some of those present, academics 
certainly know how to confuse an issue. To be fair, academics 
are not the only ones who cause confusion. There is a Federalist 
Society whose members likewise seem unable to distinguish 
Federalists from Anti-Federalists. However it is described, the 
development to which I refer has had and continues to have some 
serious consequences worthy of our attention. Before reviewing 
those consequences, I turn to an examination of how and why the 
federal government has come to be involved in the prosecution of 
crimes historically handled at the state level. 
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In urging ratification of the Constitution, the Framers 
assured their countrymen that "internal order," as they called 
it, would be the. responsibility of the several states. The 
Constitution itself refers only to a few specific crimes: 
counterfeiting; treason; piracies and felonies committed on the 
high seas; and offenses against the law of nations. The earliest 
Congresses found authority in these provisions, in their 
enumerated powers and in the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
classify as criminal various types of conduct generally thought 
to be detrimental to the operations of the central government. 
customs offenses, crimes committed within federal enclaves and 
interference with the federal courts fell within this category of 
exclusive federal jurisdiction. All other varieties of crimes 
were defined by state legislatures and prosecuted in state 
courts. 
As the nation expanded and the population increased in the 
aftermath of the Civil War, new forms of anti-social conduct came 
to the attention of Congress. In response to the "green cigar" 
scam and other quaint frauds then current, Congress included an 
anti-fraud provision in the 1872 codification of the postal laws. 
Thus was born the notion that the national interest required 
federal prosecution of any scheme or artifice to defraud as long 
as the mails were involved. The sponsor of the postal 
legislation said that the mail fraud provision was necessary "to 
prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large cities 
. by thieves, forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the 
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purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent people of the 
country." Although Congress could point to its constitutional 
power to establish post offices as authority for the legislation, 
this concept of fraud as a federal crime marked the first serious 
trenching on state criminal jurisdiction. 
At the turn of the century, Congress discovered the 
Interstate Commerce Clause as a source of criminal jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court approved, and the criminal law never has been 
the same. The supposed need to protect the channels of 
interstate commerce led to the enactment of the Lottery Act, 
prohibiting the interstate transportation of lottery tickets, and 
the Mann Act, prohibiting the transportation of women across 
state lines to engage in immoral practices. The latter statute 
impelled my late colleague, Henry Friendly, to ask this 
rhetorical question in his 1972 lecture on federal jurisdiction: 
"Why should the federal government care if a Manhattan 
businessman takes his mistress to sleep with him in Greenwich, 
Connecticut, although it would not if the love-nest were in Port 
Chester, N.Y.?" Judge Friendly questioned whether federal 
criminal prosecutions of this type serve any true federal 
interest. I question whether such prosecutions constitute a 
threat to the dual system of government so carefully constructed 
by the Framers of our Constitution. 
Misuse of the channels of commerce has formed an important 
theoretical underpinning for the ongoing expansion of federal 
criminal jurisdiction. Under this rubric, Congress has 
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replicated many state criminal statutes, adding only an 
interstate element: kidnapping, theft, transportation of stolen 
vehicles, flight to avoid prosecution, sexual exploitation of 
children, firearms offenses and gambling are some examples. As 
recently as 1984, a whole new slew of state-type offenses were 
federalized on the basis of interstate movement. These included 
the counterfeiting of credit cards and theft of livestock having 
a value in excess of $10,000. Yes indeed, cattle rustling is now 
a federal crime! 
When the Supreme Court approved congress·ional -regulation of 
activities affecting commerce, it sanctioned the most expansive 
basis for criminal intervention in crime control yet invoked. 
This concept provided the shaky constitutional support necessary 
for such legislation as the Hobbs Act, which reaches the local 
crimes of robbery and extortion, and the Extortionate Credit 
Transaction Act, which reaches the local crime of loansharking. 
The Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, which now generates 
more than twenty percent of all federal criminal prosecutions, 
includes a congressional declaration that federal prosecution of 
intrastate drug trafficking is necessary for the control of the 
interstate incidents of trafficking. Here again, the "affecting 
commerce" concept was called upon as authority for federalizing 
crimes punishable in all states of the Union. The Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act not only is grounded in 
the same interpretation of the commerce power but also includes 
in its definition of racketeering activity a list of specific 
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crimes chargeable under state law. The Travel Act is another 
example of a statute involving a wholesale incorporation of state 
crimes. The list goes on. 
I think that the impetus for the expansion of federal 
criminal law into areas of state and local concern has come from 
three directions: from Congress; from federal prosecutors; and 
from local and state governments themselves. In the case of 
Congress, a common procedure is to identify a problem involving 
unacceptable conduct in one state or region, classify that 
conduct as criminal, and define it in terms of a new federal 
crime, regardless of whether it is already a state crime. This 
procedure is often unaccompanied by any determination of the 
willingness or ability of state government to deal with the 
problem. Federal prosecutors have been known to argue for 
expansive interpretations of federal criminal legislation in an 
effort to fill perceived gaps in local criminal prosecution. An 
example is the use of the mail fraud statute to prosecute local 
criminal corruption. Unfortunately, the courts often go along 
with these arguments. Chief Justice Burger once opined that, as 
new types of frauds develop, the mail fraud statute can be used 
as a stopgap device to deal with the new phenomenon on a 
temporary basis until specific legislation is enacted. Finally, 
state and local governments, complaining of a lack of resources, 
find it convenient to defer to federal prosecution rather than to 
face up to issues they are actually in a better position to 
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confront. Sometimes, of course, a breakdown in local law 
enforcement leaves federal intervention as the only alternative. 
Reform in the criminal justice system is the theme of 
today's Conference, and reform in the criminal justice system 
requires consideration of the consequences of the federalization 
of criminal law. Some of the consequences are obvious and some 
are not so obvious, but they all implicate important pragmatic 
and constitutional problems. The consequence most obvious to me, 
of course, is the overloading of federal courts brought about by 
the prosecution of cases lacking in any direct fedei~l"interest 
or involvement. We see such cases every day and can only wonder 
why they are not prosecuted in the state courts, which are fully 
equipped to handle them. That a bank is federally insured, for 
example, does not seem to create a very great federal interest 
for conferring jurisdiction on federal courts to hear cases 
involving one hundred dollar bank thefts. Yet there is a statute 
that confers federal jurisdiction in just such cases. The 
federal courts should be reserved for such important direct 
federal interest crimes as capturing or killing carrier pigeons 
owned by the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 45; interstate 
transportation of water hyacinths, 18 u.s.c. § 46; false crop 
reports, 18 U.S.C. § 2072; and false weather reports, 18 u.s.c. § 
2074. Between 1983 and 1987, criminal filings in the United 
States District Courts increased by 25% to 42,000. In some 
districts now, the courts have little time for anything but 
criminal trials. This detracts from other important work that 
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ought to be performed by those courts, including what I consider 
to be their most important work -- the protection of individual 
civil rights and civil liberties when the states have failed to 
do so. Court overload is a serious consequence indeed. 
Every time Congress rushes to enact a criminal statute to 
deal with a problem that exists in one state or one region, there 
is an erosion of the dual system of government so carefully 
established by those who wrote our national charter. What may be 
considered serious anti-social conduct in one part of the country 
may not be considered quite so serious elsewhere. Gambling may 
be offensive to the citizens of Utah but not to the citizens of 
Nevada. The states must be allowed to accommodate such 
differences and to experiment with innovative approaches to the 
prosecution of crime. Many states already have charted new 
courses in the areas of sentencing, plea bargaining, victims' 
rights and other criminal procedures as well as in the definition 
of substantive crimes. State supreme courts have interpreted 
state constitutions to create in criminal cases rights not 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 
President Roosevelt said that a state experiment that fails 
has little effect on the rest of the nation. It is also true 
that states can modify or repeal unworkable methods and 
approaches much more quickly than can the national government. 
By contrast, federal legislation affects the entire nation, is 
cumbersome to change, and often remains on the books long after 
it loses any value it once may have had. In this regard, I refer 
7 
you to 18 u.s.c. § 336, which imposes criminal liability upon one 
who issues a check for less than $1.00, intending it to circulate 
as money. I don't know exactly what that section means, but I 
think that we can safely say that it has outlived its usefulness. 
Federal courts now are bound to sentence according to 
guidelines established by a Sentencing Commission. I cannot 
comment on the constitutionality of the legislation establishing 
the Commission, but I can question the wisdom of turning the 
federal judiciary into a corps of mechanics required to impose 
criminal punishment without regard to family considerations or 
local conditions. All of this is done in the name of eliminating 
disparity, a goal that is at least questionable. A sentence 
imposed without individualized consideration in federal court 
that would be much different if imposed in a state court for the 
same crime may serve neither the needs of the defendant nor the 
community of which he is a part. The excision of conduct 
detrimental to society must be accomplished by a scalpel rather 
than a chain saw. 
I am afraid of federal prosecutors. I am terrified by 
federal prosecutors. The reason for my fear is the extraordinary 
discretion that they have in deciding what crimes to prosecute. 
That discretion is one of the consequences of the federalization 
of criminal law. Like the Attorney General, I once was a state 
prosecutor. State prosecutors are not quite as fearsome as their 
federal counterparts because their discretion is much more 
limited. When police agencies or private individuals came to me 
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as district attorney with evidence of crime, I was constrained to 
prosecute, unless the evidence was so deficient that no case 
could be made. United States Attorneys labor under no such 
constraints. How could it be otherwise? Priorities must be 
assigned. There are only so many federal prosecutors, and they 
cannot be tied up in prosecuting the interstate transportation of 
water hyacinths. With more federal crimes on the books than 
could be prosecuted in any ordinary lifetime, government 
attorneys must be very selective as to which cases they will 
pursue and which they will decline. I remember visiting a 
federal prison facility in my district when I was a district 
judge. The warden begged me to persuade the U.S. Attorney to 
prosecute some cases of assault on prison guards. The u.s. 
Attorney had declined to prosecute those cases in favor of what 
he considered were more important matters. As federal crimes 
proliferate, there are more declinations, some of which seem 
quite arbitrary and capricious to federal law enforcement 
agencies. When there are many offenders but only a few are 
chosen to be prosecuted, the public perceives that the process is 
unfair. Moreover, in making the critical decisions about what 
types of anti-social conduct are worthy of attention, the 
prosecutor invades the domain of the legislator, and the 
separation of powers is blurred. 
There is another major consequence of the ongoing expansion 
of the criminal code through the inclusion of state-type offenses. 
I call it "the disappointment of promises unfulfilled." A more 
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harsh description might be "the deception of the public." As 
Congress passes laws purportedly solving various problems 
through the federal criminal justice system, the public often 
assumes that the law is the solution. Obviously, it is not. To 
illustrate: Everybody knows that most narcotic transactions are 
punishable under federal law. The ordinary citizen has every 
right to expect that violations will be prosecuted vigorously. 
Yet nobody makes it clear that only an infinitesimal number of 
the 55,000 narcotics arrests made in New York City in one year 
can be prosecuted federally. The federal resources simply aren't 
there. Congress can convert state crimes into federal crimes 
forever, but United States courts and United States prosecutors 
will never be able to handle more than a tiny portion of the 
tens of thousands of crimes committed in the nation each year. 
Great expectations lead to great disappointments, an unfortunate 
consequence of too much federal criminal law. 
It seems almost unnecessary to observe that two laws on the 
same subject lead to duplication duplication in investigation, 
duplication in prosecution and duplication in punishment. 
Recently, there was an unseemly competition between state and 
federal authorities in New York City over who should pursue some 
cases of municipal corruption. The clash ended in an agreement 
to divide the work. It is true, of course, that conflicts 
between state and federal agencies have diminished greatly in 
recent years as the result of the Justice Department's promotion 
of Law Enforcement Coordinating Committees. This program 
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replaces competition with cooperation among law enforcement 
agencies and has been very successful. There really is no need 
for double punishment, however, and sentences by state and 
federal courts for the same crimes, although not violative of the 
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, appear to 
violate its spirit. 
In many important respects, the federalization of criminal 
law discourages individual involvement and personal participation 
in the democratic process, and this is the final consequence I 
intend to address. Probably the greatest danger to the republic 
today is the apathy of the citizenry. For many years, I have 
told the story of the jury foreman who announces a verdict in 
these words: "Your Honor, we have decided not to get involved." 
Involvement, of course, is the key to the success of our form of 
government. My wife spends a great deal of time speaking at 
schools and colleges and wherever else young people gather to 
encourage the type of involvement of which I speak. Yet 
participation is most lacking at the level where it should be the 
most widespread -- the local government level. The citizenry 
increasingly has been conditioned to turn to federal law 
enforcement and to the federal courts as the first line of 
defense against anti-social conduct. What we are witnessing is 
an abdication of responsibility for self-government. In the face 
of municipal corruption, it is easy to send for the "feds." If 
narcotics are sold on the street corners of a major city, it is a 
simple matter to invoke high-profile federal criminal prosecution. 
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When loansharks and racketeers infest a municipality, local law 
enforcement efforts can be relaxed if federal help is on the way. 
To invite federal authorities to define and prosecute crime 
involving activities primarily of state and local interest is to 
concede that state and local government cannot be moved to serve 
the will of the people and that the people are willing to forego 
their form of government. I do not believe that Americans are 
prepared to make that concession. 
By now you know that, at least as far as I am concerned, the 
uninhibited growth of federal criminal law has produced some 
disturbing consequences. I have my own thoughts about what needs 
to be done, but those are for another day. Hopefully, every 
member of this distinguished company also will have some opinions 
and suggestions relating to the matters I have discussed. 
Regardless of where we stand on some of these issues, we have a 
common goal and that is to develop the very best criminal justice 
system possible. I am grateful for the opportunity to 
participate in this Conference because, like all of you, I am 
dedicated to that goal. 
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